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I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional reproduction is no longer the sole means of procreation.
Developments in reproductive technology have forced society to confront
traditional assumptions about the family and how the law should regard these
new technological advancements. Assisted reproductive technology has af-
forded the possibility of procreation to persons who once thought that pro-
creation was impossible.' Although society should encourage and reinforce
* The author is a J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center. Jamie L. Zuckerman is a magna cum laude graduate of Tulane University
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individual choices to nurture children, certain states have placed statutory
limits on who may qualify for reproductive technological advancements. In
Florida, the gestational surrogacy statute requires that the intended parents be
legally married.2 States have also adopted diverse approaches regarding the
presumption of parentage in custody disputes. In traditional surrogacy
agreements, Florida focuses on protecting the rights of the surrogate by al-
lowing her to revoke her consent at any time during her pregnancy and up to
forty-eight hours after the child is born.3
This article will address the constitutionality of the marriage require-
ment in Florida's gestational surrogacy statute and the repercussions of the
right to revoke consent in traditional surrogacy agreements. Part two of this
article will provide a background of gestational surrogacy and traditional
surrogacy. Part three will examine the different theories states adopt in order
to determine legal parentage. Part four will compare Florida's gestational
surrogacy statute to Florida's traditional surrogacy statute. Part five of this
article will present constitutional challenges on restricting surrogacy based
on procreative liberty and the fundamental right to marry. This section will
also examine whether Florida's surrogacy statutes are over or under-
inclusive. Part six will conclude with the premise that the increase of non-
traditional families makes it necessary for Florida to restructure its surrogacy
statutes. In addition, this section will explain how Florida should change its
surrogacy statutes so that its laws will no longer infringe on any of its resi-
dents' procreative rights.
II. BACKGROUND OF GESTATIONAL SURROGACY AND TRADITIONAL
SURROGACY
Every year, millions of couples learn that they are incapable of bearing
children. 4 "For these individuals, alternative reproduction methods are the
with a B.S. in Accounting from the A.B. Freeman School of Business. She would like to
thank her mother Candy, father Steve, and sister Taryn, as she is extremely grateful for their
continuous support and unconditional love. She would also like to thank her colleagues on
Nova Law Review and the faculty of the Law Center, extending special recognition to Profes-
sor Phyllis Coleman and Professor Carolyn Nygren.
1. See Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and
the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 597 (2002).
2. FLA. STAT. § 742.15(1) (2007).
3. Id. § 63.213(2)(a), (i).
4. Michael E. Eisenberg, Comment, What's Mine Is Mine and What's Yours Is Mine-
Examining Inheritance Rights by Intestate Succession from Children Conceived Through
Assisted Reproduction Under Florida Law, 3 BARRY L. REv. 127, 127 (2002).
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only means by which they are able to have [genetically related] children."5
Surrogacy has readily become a popular option for infertile couples.6 There
are two main types of surrogacy: traditional surrogacy and gestational surro-
gacy.7
Traditional surrogacy, referred to in Florida as preplanned adoption,' is
a pregnancy in which the surrogate "provides her own egg, which is fertil-
ized [through] artificial insemination," and then gestates the fetus for another
individual.9 The most common traditional surrogacy arrangement involves
the surrogate being artificially inseminated with the intended father's se-
men.'0 The surrogate then carries the fetus to term and gives birth to the
child for another person." In traditional surrogacy, the surrogate is geneti-
cally linked to the child because she is the biological contributor of the egg. 2
Therefore, the intended mother is never "considered the natural mother of the
child" when the child is born. 3
The second type of surrogacy, gestational surrogacy, is a pregnancy
where one woman-the intended mother-supplies the egg, which is then
fertilized, and another woman-the surrogate-gestates the fertilized egg
and gives birth to the child. 4 Gestational surrogacy can occur in several
5. Id.
6. Amy Garrity, Comment, A Comparative Analysis of Surrogacy Law in the United
States and Great Britain-A Proposed Model Statute for Louisiana, 60 LA. L. REV. 809, 809
(2000).
7. Id.
8. Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 140. Although Florida uses the term preplanned adoption,
most jurisdictions use the term traditional surrogacy. Florida's gestational surrogacy statute
uses the term commissioning couple while Florida's preplanned adoption statute uses the term
intended parents. Compare FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (2007), with id. § 63.213. Florida's pre-
planned adoption statute uses the term volunteer mother while Florida's gestational surrogacy
statute uses the term gestational surrogate. Compare id § 63.213, with id. § 742.15. For
purposes of this article, the term traditional surrogacy will be used in place of preplanned
adoption. The term intended parents will be used to refer to the intended parents in traditional
surrogacy agreements and the commissioning couple in gestational surrogacy contracts. The
term surrogate will be used to refer to the volunteer mother in traditional surrogacy agree-
ments and the gestational surrogate in gestational surrogacy contracts. For purposes of clarity,
this article will use the same terms that are used by most jurisdictions. See Denise E. Las-
carides, Note, A Plea for the Enforceability of Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, 25 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1221, 1233 (1997) (stating the common confusion between "the two types of surro-
gacy").
9. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1485 (8th ed. 2004).
10. Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Bartering for Babies: Are Preconception Agreements
in the Best Interest of Children?, 26 WHWrIER L. REV. 429, 435 (2004).
11. Id.
12. Garrity, supra note 6, at 809.
13. Storrow, supra note 1, at 609.
14. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1485 (8th ed. 2004).
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ways. 5 "The inten[ded] mother can use her own egg and the inten[ded] fa-
ther [can] use his own sperm," to create an embryo which will then be "fertil-
ized outside of the womb.' 6 The embryo is then "transplanted into the ute-
rus of the surrogate" and there is no genetic link between the surrogate and
the child because the surrogate is not the biological contributor of the egg. 7
Other forms of gestational surrogacy include "the inten[ded] father's sperm
and the egg of an anonymous donor," or the intended mother's egg and the
sperm of an anonymous donor, in order to create an embryo that will be
transplanted into the uterus of the surrogate. 8 Many persons using assisted
reproductive technologies prefer gestational surrogacy over traditional surro-
gacy "because it allows both the intended mother and father to have a bio-
logical connection to the child."' 9
In 1987, national news coverage of the case In re Baby M,2" drew public
attention to the question of where parental rights lie when an infertile mar-
ried couple contracts with another woman to bear a child on their behalf.'
The case arose when Mary Beth Whitehead, the surrogate mother, repudiated
the surrogacy contract after giving birth and finding herself unable to part
with the child.22 This was a case of traditional surrogacy, where the child
was conceived by artificial insemination.23 The child was genetically related
to both the intended father, William Stem, and the surrogate, Ms. Whitehead,
with the understanding that Mr. Stem and his wife would raise the child as
their own.2 ' The court denied the parental rights claimed by Mr. and Mrs.
Stem under the surrogacy contract by declaring such contracts void and
against public interest.25 The court recognized Mr. Stem, the intended father,
and Ms. Whitehead, the surrogate mother, as the natural parents based on
their biological relationship to the baby.26 The court granted custody to Mr.
Stem and visitation rights to Ms. Whitehead.27 This case led to "an intense
15. Garrity, supra note 6, at 809.
16. Id. at 809-10.
17. Id. at 810.
18. Id.
19. Amy M. Larkey, Note, Redefining Motherhood: Determining Legal Maternity in
Gestational Surrogacy Agreements, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 605, 606 (2003).
20. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1998).
21. See Alice Hotheimer, Note, Gestational Surrogacy: Unsettling State Parentage Law
and Surrogacy Policy, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE 571, 574 (1992).
22. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1237.
23. See id. at 1235.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1240.
26. See id. at 1247 n.9.
27. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1259, 1263-64.
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national debate and a flurry of legislative activity" with numerous states en-
acting legislation to address surrogate parenting agreements.28
III. DIFFERING APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF LEGAL PARENTAGE
Congress has not enacted federal legislation to deal with the problem of
legal parentage in cases that involve surrogacy. 9 Thus, state legislatures and
state courts have adopted different tests to determine legal parentage based
on intent, genetic contribution, gestation, and the best interests of the child.3°
The conventional surrogacy agreement involved "a fertile husband, an infer-
tile wife, and a fertile [surrogate]" who agreed to use her egg and the hus-
band's sperm to create an embryo and bear the child for the couple.3 Ad-
vances in assisted reproductive technologies, however, have made it possible
to have many potential parents: the intended mother, the intended father, the
sperm donor, the egg donor, and the surrogate.3"
When a court or legislature adopts the intent based theory, legal parent-
age is determined based on the party who "intended to bring the child into
the world" or the one who "orchestrated the reproduction."33 Following this
line of reasoning, the legal parents are the ones who planned to raise the
child.34 The intent theory was originated in California, which was one of the
initial states forced to face gestational surrogacy maternity issues.35 In John-
son v. Calvert,36 the Supreme Court of California was confronted with the
task of determining maternity between the gestational surrogate and the in-
tended mother.37 Because both of these women had a valid claim for mater-
nity, the court was forced to create a new theory of maternity and felt the
case could not "be decided without [ilnquiring into the parties' intentions.' 38
The court looked at the surrogacy contract to determine the parties' inten-
tions regarding maternity and held that "she who intended to procreate the
28. Hofheimer, supra note 21, at 574.
29. Flavia Berys, Comment, Interpreting a Rent-a-Womb Contract: How California
Courts Should Proceed When Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements Go Sour, 42 CAL. W. L.
REv. 321,333 (2006).
30. Lascarides, supra note 8, at 1227 n.19.
31. Shoshana L. Gillers, Note, A Labor Theory of Legal Parenthood, 110 YALE L.J. 691,
702 (2001).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Larkey, supra note 19, at 622.
36. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
37. Id. at 778.
38. Id. at 782.
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child-that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she
intended to raise as her own-is the natural mother under California law."39
The court's reasoning was based on the premise that the child would not
have come into being if it was not for the intended parents.' Thus, the in-
tended mother had a more natural claim to the child.4
The genetic contribution test determines parentage based on the genetic
relationship between the child and the person who contributed genetic mate-
rial.42 This theory contends that when the child is biologically linked to the
intended parents, the couple will be recognized as the legal parents of the
child.43 In Belsito v. Clark," the couple entered into a gestational surrogacy
agreement whereby the intended mother's sister would gestate the fertilized
genetic material derived from the couple.45 The hospital informed the in-
tended mother that Ohio law required that the birth certificate list her sister's
name as the natural mother.46 Therefore, the intended parents sought a de-
claratory judgment naming them as the legal parents of the child 7.4 The court
held that since the intended parents provided the genetic material for the
child, they were the child's legal and natural parents.48
Before the "emergence of assisted reproductive technologies, most ju-
risdictions [adhered to] the common law rule," which presumed that any
woman who gestates and gives birth to a child is that child's legal mother.49
Advocates of this theory rely on the significance of the gestational mother's
contribution to the child's existence.5" The jurisdictions that adopted this
theory felt that "[t]he gestational mother . . . establishes a unique physical
and emotional bond with the child during the nine months prior to birth, a
bond that the [intended parents] simply cannot attain."5 Essentially, states
that follow the gestational mother theory invalidate gestational surrogacy
contracts because the surrogate and her spouse, not the intended parents, will
always be recognized as the legal parents of the child. 2 When a jurisdiction
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
42. Larkey, supra note 19, at 624.
43. Id
44. 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio Ct. Corn. P1. 1994).
45. Id. at 761.
46. Id. at 762.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 762, 767.
49. Larkey, supra note 19, at 625.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 626.
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adopts this theory, "it discredits the constitutionally protected decision of the
intended parents and the decision of the surrogate who voluntarily partici-
pates in the arrangement."53
The last theory on legal parentage is the best interests of the child stan-
dard, where the court will grant legal parentage to the party that will best
assume the responsibilities of parentage. Proponents of this theory feel that
it allows courts to consider aspects of all theories before deciding who
should be declared the legal parents of the child." Currently, surrogacy stat-
utes usually apply the best interests of the child standard in child custody
disputes as opposed to legal parentage determinations.56 Many feel that the
best interests standard is too problematic because "[i]n some instances, de-
termining the child's best interests is just not feasible" and "[r]anking adults
by their parenting ability would be a bureaucratic nightmare."57
IV. COMPARING FLORIDA'S GESTATIONAL AND TRADITIONAL SURROGACY
STATUTES
No federal legislation has been passed to regulate surrogacy and "[t]he
differing state of the law in this area demonstrates the nation's struggle with
the moral and philosophical considerations involved."58 Due to the lack of
federal legislation, it is necessary to examine gestational surrogacy on a state
statutory basis.59 Florida law explicitly authorizes gestational surrogacy con-
tracts but the statute imposes strict requirements on the contract.60 First, a
binding and enforceable contract mpist be made between the intended parents
and the surrogate.1 In order for the contract to be binding and enforceable,
the gestational surrogate must be "[eighteen] years of age or older" and the
intended parents must be legally married and "[eighteen] years of age or old-
er.",62 Second, before entering into a surrogacy contract, a licensed physician
must determine that: 1) the intended mother is unable to gestate the fetus to
term; 2) "[t]he gestation will cause a risk to the physical health" of the in-
tended mother; or 3) "[t]he gestation will cause a risk to the health of the
53. Id. at 625.
54. Larkey, supra note 19, at 626.
55. Id.
56. Id. at627 n.177.
57. Gillers, supra note 31, at 694.
58. Berys, supra note 29, at 333.
59. See id.
60. Browne-Barbour, supra note 10, at 450.
61. FLA. STAT. § 742.15(1) (2007).
62. Id.
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fetus."63 Third, the surrogacy contract must include a provision that the ges-
tational surrogate will surrender her parental rights at the birth of the child,
unless it is determined that the child is genetically unrelated to the intended
parents. 4
Florida law also allows individuals to enter into traditional surrogacy
agreements." Although Florida limits gestational surrogacy to married cou-
ples, traditional surrogacy is available to an unmarried couple.66 The tradi-
tional surrogacy statute refers to the "intended mother" and the "intended
father," but nowhere in the statute does it say that the couple must be mar-
ried.67 The statute requires the agreement to include, "[t]hat the [surrogate]
agrees to become pregnant by the fertility technique specified in the agree-
ment, to bear the child, and to terminate any parental rights and responsibili-
ties to the child., 68 In traditional surrogacy, however, the surrogate has up to
forty-eight hours after the child is born to revoke her consent, whereas the
gestational surrogate has no right to revoke her consent.69 In gestational sur-
rogacy, one of the intended parents must be biologically linked to the child,
while no genetic connection is required for traditional surrogacy agree-
ments.70 Furthermore, in traditional surrogacy the intended mother has to
adopt the child because she and the child are not genetically linked.7' Before
she can adopt the child, the surrogate must terminate parental rights because
it is usually the surrogate's egg that is used.72 If the father's sperm was not
used via artificial insemination, then he would have to adopt the child as
well.73
In traditional surrogacy, "the agreement may be terminated at any time
by any of the parties."'74 Essentially, this could mean that the surrogate could
terminate the contract and then turn around and sue the biological and in-
63. Id. § 742.15(2)(a)-(c).
64. Id. § 742.15(3)(c), (e).
65. See id. § 63.213.
66. Compare FLA. STAT. § 742.15(1) (stating that the intended parents must be married to
qualify for gestational surrogacy), with id. § 63.213 (containing no provision requiring a cou-
ple to be married in order to qualify for traditional surrogacy).
67. See generally id. § 63.213.
68. Id. § 63.213(2)(a).
69. Compare id (stating that the surrogate has the right to revoke consent "any time
within [forty-eight] hours after the birth of the child"), with FLA. STAT. § 742.15(3)(c) (stating
that the surrogate must agree to surrender parental rights upon the birth of the child).
70. See id. §§ 742.15(3)(e), 63.213.
71. See id. § 63.213.
72. See id. § 63.213(6)(i).
73. See id. § 63.213.
74. FLA. STAT. § 63.213(2)(i).
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tended father for support.75 Due to the lack of cases in Florida focusing on
surrogacy, it is necessary to examine an earlier surrogacy case in another
state and a current custody battle in Florida.76 In the case of In re Mo-
schetta,7 a California court considered for the first time whether traditional
surrogacy contracts, where the surrogate is both the woman who gives birth
to the child and the child's biological contributor of the egg, are enforce-
able.78 The intended parents and surrogate signed an agreement which stated
that the surrogate would be artificially inseminated with the intended father's
semen so that the child would be biologically linked to the father.79 Al-
though there was clear evidence that the surrogate conceived the child with
the intent to facilitate the adoption to an infertile woman, the surrogate was
entitled to rescind the agreement and keep the child.0 The court held that the
child had one mother and that no tie-breaker was required because the ge-
netic mother and the gestational mother were the same person.8" The in-
tended mother had no claim to motherhood because she was not "equally"
the mother of the child.82 The court made it clear that couples "who resort to
traditional surrogacy ... have no assurance their intentions will be honored
in a court of law" and "[fior them and the child, biology is destiny."83 Four
years later, however, the court ruled that the intended mother does have a
claim in gestational surrogacy cases because the surrogate is not biologically
linked to the embryo.8 Thus, the intended mother in a gestational surrogacy
contract, not the surrogate or egg donor, is the lawful mother of the child.85
Presently, a baby battle is occurring in Florida between the intended
parents of a traditional surrogacy agreement and the surrogate they hired.8 6
75. See id. § 63.213(2)(d) (stating that if the intended father has a biological link to the
child "he will assume parental responsibilities for the child"); see also Ann MacLean Massie,
Restricting Surrogacy to Married Couples: A Constitutional Problem? The Married-Parent
Requirement in the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, 18 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 487, 524 (1991).
76. See Lascarides, supra note 8, at 1258. The author states that there are "few court
decisions on surrogacy contracts" and "far more law review articles discussing this topic than
court decisions." Id.
77. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Ct. App. 1994).
78. Id. at 895.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 895, 901.
81. Id. at 896.
82. Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 896.
83. Id. at 903.
84. In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293 (Ct. App. 1998).
85. Id
86. O'Reilly Factor: Bitter Baby Battle (FOX television broadcast July 20, 2007), avail-
able at 2007 WLNR 13850188 [hereinafter O'Reilly Factor].
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Gwyn and Tom Lamitina paid a surrogate to gestate their baby because they
were unable to reproduce on their own.87 The couple, who reside in Orlando,
decorated a bedroom for their baby girl, but their "biggest fear is that [they]
may not be able to bring her home.""8 The surrogate has decided that "she
wants to keep the [baby]"89 and is suing the intended father for child sup-
port.90 As a result of a prior positive surrogacy experience, the Lamitinas
signed a contract with a surrogate in 2006.9" The surrogate accepted all the
benefits of the contract, such as a $1500 deposit. 92 The couple trusted that
the surrogate would carry out the contract and focused their concerns on93 the
health of both the baby and the surrogate.94 The fact that these parties en-
tered into a traditional surrogacy agreement is a crucial part of this case be-
cause Florida law only safeguards the intended parents in a gestational surro-
gacy agreement.95 Despite the intent of the parties and "as unfortunate as it
may be, [the surrogate] was within her Florida rights to rescind the contract
when she did.",96 As a result, it seems that there is no legal recourse for the
intended parents97 and the "baby may never lay its head in [the] crib" the
couple built for her.98
Allowing the surrogate every opportunity to retract the traditional sur-
rogacy agreement at any time leaves the parties whom the "agreement was
meant to protect" constantly worrying about the uncertainty of the outcome. 99
"The intended parents must suffer throughout the pregnancy," fully aware
that they may never "become the child's parents."' ° Traditional surrogacy
agreements contain a clause that allows the surrogate to cancel the agreement
during the pregnancy as well as forty-eight hours after the birth of the
87. Grayson Kamm, Birth Battle: Couple Says Surrogate Morn Won't Give up Baby,
FIRST COAST NEWS, May 23, 2007, http://www.firstcoastnews.com/news/florida/news-
article.aspx?storyid=82698.
88. Id.
89. O'Reilly Factor, supra note 86.
90. Kamm, supra note 87.
91. Id.
92. O'Reilly Factor, supra note 86.
93. Kamm, supra note 87.
94. O'Reilly Factor, supra note 86.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Kamm, supra note 87.
99. Eric A. Gordon, Comment, The Aftermath of Johnson v. Calvert: Surrogacy Law
Reflects a More Liberal View of Reproductive Technology, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 191, 207
(1993).
100. Id. at 209.
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child.'' Thus, the intended mother and father "fear that, at any time during
and immediately following the birth of their intended [child], the surrogate
[could] exercise her option [and choose] to maintain custody of the child."' 2
Opponents of surrogacy feel that unmarried persons still have an option be-
cause they are able to enter into traditional surrogacy agreements, but they
just have to "take their chances that the surrogate [will] relinquish custody of
the child at birth."'0 3 However, if the surrogate exercises her option to main-
tain custody, the intended parents would have "no [legal] recourse""° and the
infertile couple could, in essence, become an embryological donor for the
surrogate's child.'0 5
Florida provides an expedited procedure to affirm the child's parentage
for couples participating in gestational surrogacy." "Within [three] days
after the birth of a child," the intended parents can request "an expedited
affirmation of parental status" from the court. 7 If the court determines that
the intended parents and the gestational surrogate entered into "a binding and
enforceable" contract, and at least one of the intended parents is a "genetic
parent of the child," an order is issued stating that the intended parents are
the child's legal' and natural parents."° The Department of Health then
releases a new birth certificate identifying the intended parents as the legal
parents of the child."° For individuals who enter into traditional surrogacy
agreements, expedited affirmation of parental status is not an option."'
Traditional surrogacy agreements create a "high risk of conflict" be-
cause surrogate mothers may regret their decision and refuse to surrender
custody of the child after the child is bom."2 Currently, "Florida's [tradi-
tional] surrogacy policy is geared toward protecting the surrogate,. .. not the
intended parents nor the child-the parties for whom the surrogacy agree-
ment was meant to protect at its inception."' ' Gestational surrogacy affords
infertile couples the opportunity to create a biological child because the
woman could have her "ovum artificially fertilized by the sperm of [her]
101. FLA. STAT. § 63.213(1)(b), (2)(i) (2007).
102. Gordon, supra note 99, at 209.
103. Massie, supra note 75, at 524.
104. Id.
105. Gordon, supra note 99, at 209.
106. FLA. STAT. § 742.16 (2007).
107. Id. § 742.16(1).
108. Id. § 742.16(6).
109. Id. § 742.16(7).
110. Id. § 742.16(8).
111. See FLA. STAT. § 742.16.
112. Larkey, supra note 19, at 610.
113. Gordon, supra note 99, at 207.
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husband... and implanted in the uterus of the surrogate."'"1 4 Due to the fact
that the gestational surrogate is not biologically linked to the child, the in-
tended parents, who are also the biological parents, are in "a stronger legal
position... in the event of a... custody battle.""' 5 Thus, most individuals
favor gestational surrogacy over traditional surrogacy." 6
V. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Florida requires that the intended parents in a gestational surrogacy
agreement be legally married." 7 The marriage requirement "may be viewed
by some as discriminatory and close-minded in our modem society.""' 8 Even
though unmarried persons may not want to be involved in a romantic rela-
tionship, or even if involved, may not want to marry, "they may still [pos-
sess] the desire to become [a] parent[].""' 9
Single persons wishing to assert constitutional challenges against a
legislative restriction limiting parenthood through surrogacy to
married couples have two available arguments: (1) that such a re-
striction violates their fundamental right of privacy protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it
infringes on their right to decide whether to bear or beget a child;
and (2) that this legislative classification based on marital status is
invidious discrimination which violates their rights under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 20
A. The Due Process Argument: Procreative Liberty
"The United States has a longstanding tradition of procreative liberty
and each state is responsible for protecting this constitutional liberty granted
to its citizens.'' Protections afforded under the substantive due process
doctrine are established in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Unit-
ed States Constitution.'22 The substantive due process doctrine provides that
the right to privacy protects individuals against unlawful government inva-
114. Larkey, supra note 19, at 610-11.
115. Id at 611.
116. Id. at 606.
117. FLA. STAT. § 742.15(1) (2007).
118. Becky A. Ray, Comment, Embryo Adoptions: Thawing Inactive Legislatures with a
Proposed Uniform Law, 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 423, 442 (2004).
119. Id
120. Massie, supra note 75, at 499 (footnotes omitted).
121. Garrity, supra note 6, at 812.
122. See generally U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
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sion.123 Although not explicitly stated in the Constitution, the United States
Supreme Court has declared the right to privacy a fundamental right because
it falls under the penumbra of rights that coincide with those in the Bill of
Rights.1
24
Although the United States Supreme Court "has not [yet] addressed"
whether there is a constitutional right of access to assisted reproductive tech-
nology, "it has recognized an individual's right to be free from government
intrusion" concerning matters relating to procreation, family relationships,
and child-rearing. 25 In Eisenstadt v. Baird,126 the Court extended the protec-
tion of privacy to every individual regarding the decision of whether to bear
a child. 27 In regard to family relationships, the Court has held that the fam-
ily is unique to society and that constitutional principles must be applied with
sensitivity and flexibility to meet the needs of a parent and child.
28
1. The Interests of Parents
In Skinner v. Oklahoma,129 the Court stated that the right to procreate is
"one of the basic civil rights of man" and "fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race."'' 30 Advocates of surrogacy argue that, "if the right
to procreate through the traditional, coital method is a protected right, then
procreation through surrogacy or other medically available options should
also be protected."''3  There are a growing number of infertile couples who
desperately desire to have and raise a child and "[i]t is the duty of the legisla-
ture to pass laws to protect the[se] citizens ... and ensure that all of the ben-
efits of reproductive technology are available to every member of ... soci-
ety."'3 2 Surrogacy supporters contend that "the liberty interests protected by
the Constitution do not change definition because of the presence or absence
of reproductive technology."' 133 After all, a woman has a fundamental right
123. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-83 (1965).
124. Id. at 483.
125. Lisa L. Behm, Legal, Moral & International Perspectives on Surrogate Motherhood:
The Call for a Uniform Regulatory Scheme in the United States, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE
L. 557, 563 (1999).
126. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (plurality opinion).
127. Id. at 453.
128. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
129. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
130. Id. at 541.
131. Gordon, supra note 99, at 200.
132. Garrity, supra note 6, at 832.
133. Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women or a
Commodification of Women's Bodies and Children?, 12 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 113, 121 (1997).
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to control her body and the choice of becoming a surrogate or hiring a surro-
gate is a woman's reproductive choice. 34 Furthermore, assisted conception
is still a form of conception, "and arguably no more 'artificial' than the con-
traceptive devices" the United States Supreme Court recognized in Griswold
v. Connecticut3 ' and Eisenstadt.' Therefore, the due process argument is
that "the fundamental right to 'bear or beget a child' [must] include[] access
to any [legal] means of procreation."'3
Proponents of a narrow interpretation of the fundamental right to pro-
create argue that procreative liberty "simply means the right to have natural
children."'3 These proponents argue that the Court's definition of a right to
privacy does not extend to untraditional means of reproduction because these
means "are beyond the scope of the constitutionally recognized procreative
liberty."' 39 While advocates of surrogacy acknowledge the procreative rights
of both the intended mother and the gestational surrogate, opponents feel
"that the procreative choice of a gestational surrogate in conceiving, deliver-
ing, and transferring a child to its genetic parents is not the constitutional
equivalent of exercising her procreative choice to bear her own child."'14
Opponents of surrogacy suggest that because the right to have a third party
serve as a surrogate is not "deeply rooted in tradition," the parties do not
have the constitutional right to have a child if it means that the child will be
conceived through surrogacy. 14 ' Further, some caution that bringing a third
party-the surrogate-into the procreative relationship will put a strain upon
the traditional notions of parenthood and family.'42
In the case of surrogacy, however, none of the state's arguments regard-
ing religious and moral "concerns are justified by harm to another individ-
ual." 43 "[S]tate concerns that do not pose a tangible threat of harm to others
cannot justify the government's intrusion on fundamental rights."'" Re-
stricting gestational surrogacy to a certain class of persons, therefore, would
infringe upon the rights of infertile couples to engage in procreation in situa-
134. Id. at 166.
135. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
136. Kerian, supra note 133, at 121.
137. Id. at 121-22.
138. Browne-Barbour, supra note 10, at 469.
139. Kerian, supra note 133, at 121.
140. Browne-Barbour, supra note 10, at 469.
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. Krista Sirola, Comment, Are You My Mother? Defending the Rights of Intended
Parents in Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements in Pennsylvania, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 131, 153 (2006).
144. ldat153n.150.
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tions where the intended parents want to both be biologically linked to the
child.'45
2. The Best Interest of the Child
The United States Supreme Court has stated that children are entitled to
"constitutionally protected rights and liberties" and that "[a] child has a natu-
ral right ... to be nurtured" just as parents have the right to conceive. 46 Al-
though preconception agreements affect the substantive rights of the unborn
child, "no one represents the interests of the [unborn] children in these con-
tracts.'
147
In order to justify limiting gestational surrogacy to a certain class of
persons, "the state must meet the [extremely] high burden of strict scru-
tiny.' 48 The state is required to show that the regulation is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest. 49 Often times, a state will argue that it
limits surrogacy in order to protect the best interests of the child. 5 ' It could
be difficult to prove, however, that a child raised by its biological parents as
opposed to its intended parents is "a compelling interest because there is no
identifiable harm in placing [a child] with [its] intended parents.''. Oppo-
nents of surrogacy believe in limiting the number of people who can qualify
for this procedure because they feel surrogacy will ultimately have an ad-
verse effect on the unborn child.'52 Rather, the beneficiaries of surrogacy
agreements are the ones who would most probably become reliable and de-
voting parents.
53
The people who have struggled so hard to conceive their own child
are probably the best candidates to be good parents and not the
worst. It hardly seems likely that a couple that endured so much
grief to have its own child would embark on a course of abuse and
neglect with a surrogate child .... After all, children conceived by
normal means often run a far greater risk of abuse. There is surely
a risk of abuse even in apparently stable families. The risk is
greater for children born of troubled marriages that end in divorce,
145. Id. at 153; see also Garrity, supra note 6, at 809-10.
146. Browne-Barbour, supra note 10, at 468.
147. Id.
148. Sirola, supra note 143, at 151-52.
149. Id. at 152; see also Massie, supra note 75, at 490-91.
150. Sirola, supra note 143, at 152.
151. Id.
152. See Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81
VA. L. REv. 2305, 2320 (1995).
153. See Lascarides, supra note 8, at 1251.
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and still greater for illegitimate children, especially if the mother's
new boyfriend moves in. In these cases, [the legislature does] not
think that the risk of harm to children constitutes a powerful reason
to license, limit, or ban procreation: it seems hard to believe that
these concerns rise to this level in a surrogacy context.
54
B. The Equal Protection Argument
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
equal treatment for individuals who are similarly situated.'55  Thus,
"[s]tatutes that discriminate between married and unmarried individuals and
between men and women's reproductive rights may . . . violate the Equal
Protection Clause."'56  In states that prohibit same-sex marriage, such as
Florida,'57 "[a] gay man or a lesbian's equal protection rights may be violated
because many states provide statutory protection of assisted reproductive
technologies only to married individuals.' 5 8
The Supreme Court has determined that the right to procreate [is]
fundamental, and any ban on that right is subject to strict scrutiny.
With strict scrutiny, a state must show that it had a compelling in-
terest in creating its ban, and that the statute was narrowly drawn.
With assisted reproductive technology, a state would have to al-
lege differences between unmarried and married individuals, or be-
tween men and woman [sic], sufficient to demonstrate a compel-
ling interest in denying unmarried individuals... statutory protec-
tion with assisted reproductive technologies. The second step
would require a state to demonstrate that the ban was neither over
nor under-inclusive.' 59
1. Married and Unmarried Individuals
Gestational surrogacy permits married couples, who choose to utilize
assisted reproductive technologies, to be recognized "as the legal parents of
[the] child.' '"" ° However, unmarried couples are deprived of this privilege. 6
154. Epstein, supra note 152, at 2320-21 (footnote omitted).
155. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
156. Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to Assisted Repro-
ductive Technologies Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE
L. 147, 180 (2000).
157. See FLA. STAT. § 741.212(1) (2007).
158. DeLair, supra note 156, at 180.
159. Id. at 181 (footnotes omitted).
160. Storrow, supra note 1, at 639.
[Vol. 32
16
Nova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 10
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol32/iss3/10
EXTREME MAKEOVER-SURROGACY EDITION
Requiring marriage as a prerequisite for gestational surrogacy contracts "is
unfortunate, as it perpetuates the law's failure to recognize the many non-
traditional forms of the family that exist in society today."'6 2 It is important
to recognize that being born into a two-parent traditional family certainly
does not guarantee that the child will grow up in that environment.'63 Cur-
rently, "[a]n increasingly large number of children" are raised by single par-
ents, and just because a child is born to a single parent does not mean that is
how the child will grow up."6 Single parents often find companions with
whom they are able to form a new, two-parent family unit.'65 There is a
strong argument that it is better for a child to grow up in a loving environ-
ment with a single parent as opposed to the child being raised in an argumen-
tative and stressful two-parent household.'66 Several states have enacted pro-
surrogate legislation and "the marital status of the biological father and/or the
intended mother is typically irrelevant in determining a presumption of par-
enthood."'67 Although Florida has enacted surrogacy legislation, the Florida
statute restricts unmarried couples from participating in gestational surro-
gacy.16
8
In Griswold, the United States Supreme Court invalidated a state statute
that banned the use of contraceptives by married couples. 169 The Court held
that the penumbra of rights stemming from the Bill of Rights guarantee a
parent's right to be free from governmental interference when making deci-
sions pertaining to conception and child rearing. 70 In Eisenstadt, the Court
emphasized that "the right to privacy means ... the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child."' 71 It can be inferred from several United States Supreme
Court decisions, when looked at comprehensively, that the Court stands for a
161. Id.
162. Id. at 639-40.
163. Massie, supra note 75, at 511 (internal quotations omitted).
164. Id. at 511-12.
165. Id. at 512.
166. Id. at 511-12.
167. Daniel Rosman, Surrogacy: An Illinois Policy Conceived, 31 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 227,
248 (2000).
168. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15(1) (2007) (requiring that a couple be legally married in order
to qualify for gestational surrogacy).
169. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
170. Id. at 482-83, 485.
171. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (plurality opinion) (citing Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).
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constitutional right to procreate regardless of marital status. 7 2 "Although it
is permissible to limit the procreative [rights] of prisoners and probationers,
it is inconsistent with the American constitutional tradition to condition pro-
creative liberty upon marital status.' ' 173 Thus, to survive strict scrutiny, a
state's regulation must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling state in-
terest. 74 However, "[t]he language of Eisenstadt suggests that the state has
no compelling interest in limiting procreative rights to married couples.' 75
As such, "a legislative requirement that only married couples" meet the defi-
nition of intended parents in Florida's gestational surrogacy statute may not
pass heightened scrutiny.1
76
According to the Equal Protection Clause, persons who are similarly si-
tuated must be treated equally. 77 Therefore, "unmarried persons become a
class who are otherwise similarly situated but treated differently."'' 78 Unmar-
ried persons who cannot naturally procreate are similarly situated to married
persons who cannot naturally procreate because both are only able to procre-
ate through the use of assisted reproductive technology. 79 However, unmar-
ried persons are not treated equally because many state statutes will only
allow married persons legal access to gestational surrogacy. 8 ' Although
financial security and maturity are listed as reasons behind the marriage re-
quirement, "[e]vidence of marital status ...is neither necessary nor suffi-
cient for establishing these traits."'' "A more liberal surrogacy policy in this
country would allow all infertile couples, not just the ones who are deemed
worthy by their state legislature, the opportunity to become a family."' 182
172. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that a woman has the right
to terminate a pregnancy); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-55 (plurality opinion) (stating that
unmarried couples have a constitutionally protected right of privacy to use contraceptives);
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (invalidating the state's ban on the use of contraceptives for
married couples).
173. Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children from the Marriage Movement: The Case
Against Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 305, 327 (2006).
174. Massie, supra note 75, at 490-91.
175. Id. at 491.
176. See id. at 512.
177. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
178. DeLair, supra note 156, at 180..
179. Id.
180. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15(1) (2007).
181. Storrow, supra note 173, at 323.
182. Gordon, supra note 99, at 202.
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2. Men and Women's Reproductive Rights: Gay Men and Lesbian Women
"[A]pproximately four million gay men and lesbian women [are] raising
between eight and ten million children."'8 3 Comparable to heterosexual cou-
ples, countless gay men and lesbian women also possess the desire to both
bear and raise children.'8 Many of these individuals want to form a family
unit and provide a child the benefit of their love and dedication.'85 After all,
"[t]hey too have been brought up in families and in a society that identifies
having and rearing children as an important source of meaning and fulfill-
ment."'186 Florida prohibits marriage between persons of the same sex and
defines the term "marriage" as "only [the] legal union between [a] man and
[a] woman."' 87 Florida also explicitly states that it will not for any purpose
recognize same-sex marriages entered into in another jurisdiction.'88 Due to
the fact that Florida bans same-sex marriage, these couples are unable to
marry and thus, unable to qualify for gestational surrogacy.'89
By continuing to advocate vociferously for favored treatment of
married couples in matters of legal parenthood, the heterosexuals-
only marriage movement not only works against our legal tradi-
tions and values, but also ultimately undermines the welfare of
many children whose best hope lies with parents the law does not
allow to marry.' 90
Because gay men and lesbian women do not engage in the traditional
means of reproduction, they must utilize "assisted reproductive technologies
in order to produce genetically related children."' 9'
Although assisted reproductive technology is now available that would
enable homosexuals to have children, gays and lesbians are still confronted
with numerous barriers.' 92 Statutory and case law both create obstacles for
homosexuals utilizing reproductive technology because they "will not have
183. DeLair, supra note 156, at 147.
184. Id. at 148.
185. Id.
186. John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 323, 330 (2004).
187. FLA. STAT. § 741.212(1), (3) (2007).
188. Id. § 741.212(1) (emphasis added).
189. See id. § 742.15(1) (stating a gestational surrogacy contract will not be binding and
enforceable unless the intended parents are legally married).
190. Storrow, supra note 173, at 306 (emphasis omitted).
191. DeLair, supra note 156, at 148.
192. Id.
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equal legal standing in defending a parental or custodial challenge."'93 In
states such as Florida, where same-sex couples are prevented from legally
marrying, "their family unit[] [is] not recognized as [a] legal entit[y]."'94
Second-parent adoption law has the ability to remedy this situation because
the non-biological parent can "petition the court to adopt the child" in order
to establish legal parentage.'95 However, same-sex couples are confronted
with additional legal barriers because second-parent adoption is not an option
for gays and lesbians living in states that ban homosexuals from adopting. 6
For example, Florida's adoption statute explicitly prohibits adoption by gay
and lesbian persons.'9 7 As such, in Florida, since a child is unable to be
adopted by a homosexual second-parent, the child will "never have two legal
parents."'98 Gay and lesbian couples want access to assisted reproductive
technology for this exact reason. 199
Opponents of gay and lesbian access to assisted reproduction assert that
it is unnatural.2 "° However, it is no more unnatural than interfering with na-
ture and assisting infertile individuals with the ability to reproduce.2"' Oppo-
nents also feel that gay or lesbian parents would negatively impact a child.2" 2
Yet, many studies show that gay and lesbian parents are equally capable par-
ents and "their children are as well-adjusted as ... children" raised by het-
erosexual parents.20 3 "Conventional notions of homosexuality and its per-
ceived effect on children is [sic] antiquated and scientifically unfounded"
and "[n]o study has ever conclusively linked homosexuality to poor parent-
age.,,°
It is clear that states are free to deny gays and lesbians the right to be
adoptive parents.2 °5 In fact, Florida's statute clearly states, "[n]o person eli-
gible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual."2 6
But "[i]n situations in which gays and lesbians seek to bring a child into the
world, claims that children are best raised in a heterosexual married family
193. Id at 162.
194. Id at 171.
195. Id.
196. DeLair, supra note 156, at 171-73.
197. See FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2007).
198. Storrow, supra note 173, at 341.
199. DeLair, supra note 156, at 171.
200. Robertson, supra note 186, at 330.
201. Id. at 331.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 332.
204. Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 147.
205. See FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2007).
206. Id.
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have no logical relevance to protecting the child's welfare, because the child
in question would not otherwise have existed."20 7 Children who otherwise
would not have existed are not harmed by being born to gays and lesbians.0 8
"Because a life with a gay or lesbian parent is still a meaningful life, those
children are hardly protected by preventing their birth altogether.""2 9 Thus,
harm to future offspring would not satisfy a compelling state interest test or
even a rational basis test by denying gays or lesbians the right to reproduce,
whether by traditional means or with the help of reproductive technology.2 10
"Rather than undermine families or harm offspring, access to [assisted repro-
ductive technologies] for gays and lesbians will promote parenting and fam-
ily values, just as it does for heterosexuals., 21
3. Are Florida's Surrogacy Statutes Over or Under-Inclusive?
In order to justify the restrictions placed on gestational surrogacy, a
state could argue "that it has a compelling interest in [protecting] public
morals" and unmarried persons or homosexual persons procreating would
tarnish the concept of traditional family.2 12 The weakness in that argument,
however, is a substantial decrease in the amount of children growing up in a
traditional family household.2 3 In Troxel v. Granville,1 4 the United States
Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he composition of families varies greatly
from household to household" and "demographic changes of the past century
make it difficult to speak of an average American family. 2 5 Nevertheless,
even if protecting the notion of the traditional family was deemed a compel-
ling interest, "any statute that sought to protect notions of traditional family
by barring access to assisted reproductive technology would be over-
inclusive. 21 6
The state might also argue that restricting gestational surrogacy to cer-
tain persons is permissible because it has a compelling interest in protecting
the health, or more specifically the psychological welfare of its citizens.217
207. Robertson, supra note 186, at 333.
208. Id. at 347.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at372.
212. DeLair, supra note 156, at 182.
213. Id.
214. 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion).
215. Id. at 63.
216. DeLair, supra note 156, at 182.
217. Id.
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A surrogacy arrangement can psychologically harm the surrogate
mother who must relinquish a child she gestated and gave birth to.
The intended parent(s) could suffer psychologically if a surrogate
were to challenge custody. A child could be harmed if he knew he
was conceived by artificial means and then given up by his moth-
er. Even if the state's argument was sound, a ban against surro-
gacy is under-inclusive because it fails to consider other practices
that would have a similar emotional impact on all parties.218
It seems ironic that Florida would use the psychological health of the
child as a compelling interest when courts are aware that their rulings are
inconsistent with the child's best interests.219 In Wakeman v. Dixon,22 two
women lived together and were domestic partners. 2 ' Thereafter, they
"jointly entered into a[n] ... agreement with a sperm donor., 222 The agree-
ment made reference to both parties and described each of them using the
terms "mother" and "co-parent. "223 "[T]he sperm donor relinquished [all of
his] parental rights" in the agreement and agreed that the "'co-parents'
[would] be responsible for all decisions regarding [the] child conceived
through sperm donation., 224 After Ms. Dixon twice became pregnant, the
couple entered into a co-parenting agreement where both parties recognized
that each parent would "jointly parent the child., 225 Subsequently, the couple
separated, Ms. Dixon relocated with the two children, and Ms. Wakeman
sought "a declaration of parental rights to the two children bom to [Ms.] Di-
xon" based on their agreement.26 The court granted Ms. Dixon's petition to
dismiss and found that it did not have the authority to grant custody or com-
pel visitation by a person who was not a natural parent. 227 Although "the trial
court noted that ... the guardian ad litem. . . made a compelling argument
that it [was] in the best interest[] of the children to enforce the co-parenting
agreement[], 228 the court found the agreement unenforceable.229
218. Id.
219. See Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669, 674 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (Van
Nortwick, J., concurring).
220. Id. at 669 (majority opinion).
221. Id. at 670.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Wakeman, 921 So. 2d at 670.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 671.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Wakeman, 921 So. 2d at 673.
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In his concurring opinion, Judge Van Nortwick explained that even
though it "would be in the best interests of the ... children" to enforce the
co-parenting agreement, "Florida law does not provide a remedy" which
allows the court to make such a ruling.23° He acknowledged that "[t]he num-
ber of children in Florida raised in ... non-traditional households" is escalat-
ing and he is "concerned that ... Florida law ignores the needs of those chil-
dren., 231 His purpose of writing a concurring opinion was "to urge the Flor-
ida Legislature to address the needs of the children born into or raised in
these non-traditional households'2 32 because this case was evidence that
"Florida law does not protect the interests of the child produced by assisted
reproduction." 233 In Florida, the reality is that a child growing up in a non-
traditional household "is not protected either by statutory rights or by the
ability of courts to secure the best interests of the child., 234
VI. CONCLUSION
Surrogacy provides an attractive reproductive alternative to the large
number of couples suffering from infertility. As a result of the rapid ad-
vancement of reproductive technology, non-traditional family units now have
the ability to raise children. Medical technology should be obtainable by all
persons, regardless of an individual's gender, marital status, or sexual orien-
tation. Moral values alone should not dictate how a person exercises his or
her right of procreative liberty. "Disapproval of single parenthood or homo-
sexuality would not provide ... a justification"235 for denying some persons
access to assisted reproductive technology while granting those services to
others.
States such as Florida, which follow a more traditional interpretation of
parentage, family, and marriage, preclude many deserving individuals the
chance to raise a child. As a consequence of this conventional interpretation,
there is a dual failure. Both children, who could have been brought into this
world, and good parents, yearning for positive family units, are denied such
opportunities. In Florida, the only couples who qualify for gestational surro-
gacy are those that are both married and incapable of having a child through
traditional means. This exclusionary prerequisite, however, results in the
infringement of procreative rights for many individuals who are prohibited
230. Id. at 674 (Van Nortwick, J., concurring).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 674-75.
234. Wakeman, 921 So. 2d at 675.
235. Robertson, supra note 186, at 349.
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from participating in this miraculous technology. Florida's gestational sur-
rogacy statute does not allow unmarried individuals or same-sex couples to
participate in gestational surrogacy.236 This statute does not reflect the reality
that the number of non-traditional families is rapidly increasing. Addition-
ally, the number of children conceived by reproductive technology is also
escalating. If the public continues to perpetuate negative views of surrogacy,
it could lead to children questioning their existence if they were to find out
how they were conceived. Surely, that result would not be in the best inter-
est of the child. With the composition of current family units shifting, it is
crucial for society to focus on the advantageous aspects of surrogacy:
[T]he impact on the child who learns that her genetic parents
wanted her so much that they went through many medical proce-
dures and spent thousands of dollars in order to bring her into this
world, that she was not an accident but, instead, the miracle child
for which her parents prayed for years; the impact on the birth
mother who realizes that she gave to an infertile couple the mira-
cle of birth and the joy of family life; and the impact on the [in-
tended] parents once they hold the child in their arms and ac-
knowledge that she is theirs to raise and love.237
With society's recognition of this stance, the accompanying result would be
beneficial to all parties involved in surrogacy arrangements.
In view of the increase of non-traditional families coupled with ad-
vancements in reproductive technologies, Florida needs to re-evaluate its
traditional definitions of family and parentage. Florida should provide equal
and uniform opportunities to married heterosexuals, unmarried heterosexu-
als, and homosexuals who wish to participate in surrogacy. By adopting
California's surrogacy provisions, individuals employing surrogate mothers
would be able to obtain pre-birth judgments of parentage regardless of their
marital status, sexual orientation, or genetic contribution to the child.
In both traditional surrogacy agreements and gestational surrogacy con-
tracts, the "intended parent" should be defined as a single adult man, a single
adult woman, or an adult couple, regardless of gender or sexuality, who
agree, in writing, to be the legal parents of the child conceived through as-
sisted reproductive technology. In traditional surrogacy custody disputes,
Florida should consider both the best interests of the child and the intentions
236. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15(1) (2007) (stating that the intended couple must be legally
married in order to qualify for gestational surrogacy); see also id. § 741.212(1) (stating that
"[m]arriages between persons of the same sex" are not recognized in Florida).
237. Lascarides, supra note 8, at 1234.
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of the contracting parties. In cases where both parties are deemed fit, courts
should concentrate on the parties' intentions. The adjudication of legal par-
entage should be in favor of the party who intended to raise the child.
Thus, the Florida Legislature should strike the marriage requirement in
the gestational surrogacy statute as well as the right to revoke consent in the
traditional surrogacy statute. Florida residents who are deemed fit to raise a
child should not be denied the right to access any kind of assisted reproduc-
tive technology. Once a surrogate signs a traditional surrogacy agreement,
she should be held to fulfilling her intentions of gestating a child for a couple
who is unable to do so without her help. Citizens are entitled to a sense of
legal predictability when they make constitutionally protected decisions re-
garding their procreative lives. Florida must revise its surrogacy statutes to
reflect modem times.
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